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ABSTRACT: This paper presents a psychoanalytical perspective on fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalism is inextricably linked to the history of the modern and industrial world, to the 
transformation of the class structure, to colonization and to the development of science and new 
technologies. All types of fundamentalism share protesting and reacting against change. Cultural 
identity is a key concept for understanding fundamentalism, which seeks to defend it. On this 
matter, Freud and Lacan have shown that the process of identification is based on a structural 
alienation and the fragility of the subject in cultural identification and their need to belong leads to 
rigidity and blind obedience. 
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RÉSUMÉ: Cet article présente une perspective psychanalytique sur le fondamentalisme. Le 
fondamentalisme est inextricablement liée à l'histoire du monde moderne et industrielle, à la 
transformation de la structure de classe, à la colonisation et au développement de la science et des 
nouvelles technologies. Tous les types de fondamentalisme protestant et réagissent contre le 
changement. L'identité culturelle est un concept clé pour comprendre le fondamentalisme, qui 
cherche a la défendre. A ce sujet, Freud et Lacan ont montré que le processus d'identification est 
basé sur une aliénation structurelle et la fragilité du sujet dans l'identification culturelle et de leur 
besoin d'appartenance conduit à la rigidité et l'obéissance aveugle. 
MOTS-CLÉS: Fondamentalisme. Psychanalyse. Identité culturelle. 
 
RESUMEN: El artículo presenta una perspectiva psicoanalítica sobre el fundamentalismo. El 
fundamentalismo es una especie de fanatismo reciente intrínsecamente ligado a la historia del 
mundo industrial moderno, a los cambios de la estructura de clases, la colonización y el desarrollo 
de la ciencia y las nuevas tecnologías. Todos los tipos de fundamentalismos comparten protestas y 
reacciones contra el cambio, y la identidad cultural es un concepto clave para  su propia 
comprensión. Freud y Lacan, en este sentido, han demostrado que el proceso de identificación, para 
este caso, se basa en una alienación estructural en la cual se percibe  una fragilidad del sujeto quien, 
mediante  identificación cultural y su necesidad de pertenencia a algo, se conduce a la rigidez y la 
obediencia ciega. 
PALABRAS CHAVE: Fundamentalismo. Psicoanálisis. Identidade cultural.  
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RESUMO: O artigo apresenta um olhar psicanalítico sobre o fundamentalismo. O fundamentalismo 
é um tipo de fanatismo recente intrinsecamente ligado à história do mundo moderno e industrial, 
às transformações da estrutura de classe, à colonização e ao desenvolvimento da ciência e novas 
tecnologias. Todos os seus tipos compartilham protestos e reações contra a mudança. A identidade 
cultural é um conceito essencial para a compreensão do fundamentalismo, que visa a defesa dessa 
identidade. Freud e Lacan, nesse sentido, têm mostrado que o processo de identificação se baseia 
em uma alienação estrutural e que a fragilidade do sujeito na identificação cultural e a sua 
necessidade de pertencer o leva à rigidez e a obediência cega.  
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Fundamentalismo. Psicanálise. Identidade cultural. 
 
 
During an anti-US protest in Bangladesh in 
October 2001, the demonstrators carried large 
banners in support of Osama bin Laden. On some 
of these posters, Bert, one of the Muppets of 
Sesame Street, was shown peeking from behind bin 
Laden’s left shoulder. The connection caused some 
perplexity: the West’s public enemy number one 
was shown alongside a children’s character loved 
by the American media and a mouthpiece for 
American values.  
If it is true that all types of fundamentalism 
share protesting and reacting against change, 
resisting the modernization and secularization 
which they regard as a threat to the very roots of 
their alleged “cultural identity”, it is also true that, 
as the above example shows, the contamination 
they resist so furiously has always already 
happened. We see this in the weapons that the 
fundamentalist fighters use, in the different media 
technologies they employ, in the banking system 
where they invest their money, in the racist slogans 
borrowed from the very cultures they are fighting 
against and so on. Fundamentalists are an integral 
part of the world they condemn and they make 
ample use of its resources and customs.  
Given that each fundamentalist considers 
himself the guardian of a certain orthodoxy bound 
to protect his identity, as well as the identity of his 
group, it is  useful to examine the topic of “cultural 
identity” in more details. The notion of “cultural 
identity” hearkens back to the historical and 
cultural baggage specific to a given social group, 
which most of the time shares the same language, 
and includes the traditions, experiences, rules, 
values, habits and know-how that are related to the 
way in which the group maintains and organizes 
itself, treats its members and behaves towards its 
geographical environment. The notion was at the 
basis of the modern concept of the nation, which 
went hand in hand with the assertion of the 
principle of popular sovereignty and the 
introduction of the new conception of the state. 
Following the 18th century revolutions, the legal 
adoption of natural law (the philosophical doctrine 
which attributes to man certain natural and 
inalienable rights, freedom and equality) implies an 
understanding of the state whose power is no 
longer absolute but limited. Based on an 
individualistic view of society, the state is now 
considered a function of the individual and the 
individual no longer considered a function of the 
State.  
History indicates that the notion of 
“cultural identity” is by its very nature in flux; it is 
inhabited by constant transformations, which 
reflect the changes in the social bond and in the 
individuals that belong to it. Cultural identity 
maintains an unstable equilibrium between 
tradition and transformation. It is by definition an 
aspheric idea, as it is always the case in the domain 
of ‘identity’. On this matter, psychoanalysis has 
much to offer. It has shown that the process of 
identification relies on a structural alienation. As 
Lacan points out, the emergence of the subject of 
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the statement necessitates a passage through an 
undefined subject and a reciprocal subject, which 
are logical agencies within the collective. Through  
a specific context (symbolic, imaginary and real); 
through language,  lalangue and the primary 
affective environment where the exchange with the 
other inscribes jouissance in the body; through  the 
identifying with the expectations and fantasies of 
the child’s caretakers, the elements of a primary 
cultural identity, which is at the same time a 
subjective identity, are articulated. The exchange 
with the other is by definition a transmission, since 
it carries within itself, as Lacan puts it, the sound 
deposits (“dépôts sonores”) of “the ways in which 
a group handles its unconscious experience”[1974, 
p.189].  
What we call “culture” is a social bond 
infused with the subject’s libidinal and affective 
relationships to the collective from which the 
subject originates, whose resonances we will 
continue to carry throughout our lives. The feeling 
of belonging to a specific cultural identity provokes 
immediate affective responses: whether it is 
nostalgia, joy, shame or rejection. This is 
inevitable, given that it results from an “operation” 
of identification that had initially mapped out the 
territory of the subject’s  drives and structured his 
relationship to the world. However, based on these 
premises, the identificatory process continues to 
operate throughout a lifetime, depending on our 
social life and standing, on the historical context in 
which we live, on our work and studies, our health, 
interests and so on. Always in a state of becoming, 
cultural identity includes both the idea of a 
community of kin and the ideas of plurality and 
difference. In this sense, the way in which the term 
is used -- and abused–- by all those who would like 
to turn it into a finite set of specific characteristics, 
which could be counted and determined, is quite 
paradoxical. It is a contradiction in terms, a 
hypostasis of sameness: a cult of the One that 
contradicts the divided nature of the subject of 
language and serves as a basis for nationalist, racist 
and segregationist claims.  
In relation to this, we remark that the larger 
the need to adhere to a pre-established identity, the 
stronger the necessity to manifest this need, the 
weaker is the subject that is expressing it. This is 
the case, for example, with many young people 
during adolescence, when the need to separate 
oneself from one’s original environment and 
become independent, as well as the need to give 
meaning to the problems of existence, can result in 
one’s joining all kinds of identity formations, 
which are often fetishized or radicalized. The 
vulnerable subject finds support in identifying with 
a group, in which, as Freud has shown, putting a 
person, thing or ideology in the place of the ideal, 
fosters the libidinal ties among members and 
strengthens the feeling of belonging. The result is 
often a homogenization and uniformisation, a 
bracketing of subjective responsibility and 
sometimes a blind obedience to the rules dictated 
by the ideal. By giving the individual a sense of 
certainty, the group masks the subject’s own 
insecurity and restores a feeling of unity that is by 
nature fleeting. Let us note that the more the 
symbolic context is lacking (lack of recognition 
and social integration, lack of education, affective 
isolation, segregation, marginalization and so on), 
the more unstable is the subjective image and the 
sense of self. The ego responds to this instability 
with a defensive rigidity, a paranoiac turgidity, 
which easily leads to aggressiveness, violence and 
self-destruction. Hatred is triggered by the ego’s 
reaction to the very alienation that constitutes it. 
Resonding to the transitivism with the other 
inherent in the operation of identification, hatred 
reacts to one of the forms of the subject’s ex-
sistence.  
Often, the group exploits the subject’s 
paranoiac tendency and legitimizes it, turning it 
into the substance of a collective revolt against “the 
other”, “the outside”, “the enemy” – whose 
function is to consolidate the group’s identity. 
Leaders take advantage of the individual weakness 
to reinforce the group’s cohesion, obtaining in this 
way the submission of its members. This 
submission relies on manipulating individual 
libidinal drives, which are allowed to roam free in 
the service of a common ideology, whether the 
individual is rewarded or gratified, thus boosting 
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his narcissism, or by allowing him to kill, rape, 
dominate, humiliate and so on, thus satisfying what 
Freud called Murderlust, the lust for murder. 
Resorting to cultural orthodoxy as a 
guarantee of total identity is both a mark of 
weakness and a very precise attempt at 
manipulating the social bond. In this context, we 
should distinguish between the two concepts of 
nation and nationalism. It is interesting to note that 
when a people recognizes itself as a “nation” (from 
the Latin verb nasci, “to be born”), it does so based 
on the construction of a collective memory. The 
latter is not necessarily derived from factual 
elements; it can include both facts that have 
actually occurred and myths and legends. All of 
these elements make it possible to characterize a 
given social bond as distinct from another. Based 
on the meaning of the received tradition, such a 
construction retroactively assigns a function to 
what the group itself defines as its historical 
baggage, depending on the requirements of the 
present-day community. This shows how memory, 
by turning backwards, is constructed in a forward 
fashion. This is a process of identification and 
selection, which, by linking together factual and 
imaginary elements, ensures that its own history is 
only to be constructed in the encounter with 
difference.   
If by “nation” we mean a cultural 
community of territorial relations of kinship, where 
the notion of kinship structurally implies the idea 
of difference, we must distinguish this concept 
from both the “state” and from the ideology we call 
“nationalism.” A “state” designates a structure 
exercising sovereignty over a given territory, 
through institutions that promulgate and maintain 
certain laws and govern the relationships between 
individual citizens. A nation can become a state, 
but a state can contain different nations; the two 
concepts, one cultural and the other legislative, do 
not overlap. On the other hand, “nationalism” 
denotes an ideology (and a relatively recent one, if 
we think of Johan Gottlieb Fichte’s 1808 Reden an 
die deutsche Nation), which is founded on 1) the 
opposition between one nation and an other (which 
can emerge even within the structure of a single 
state) and 2) the support of a single, systematic 
vision unable to tolerate difference. In this sense, 
nothing is further away from the idea of a nation -- 
a community within kinship -- than nationalism.  
This is worth keeping in mind because in 
many cases, past or present, the appeal to 
nationalism destroys the nation’s cultural identity. 
Nazi Germany was a macroscopic example of this. 
The invention of the Aryan race and its mythology, 
the apex of an identity construction whose 
elements were over determined by a very precise 
political and economic project, tore to pieces the 
social fabric of between the wars Germany, 
destroying its pluralistic cultural identity and 
dismantling certain aspects that were crucial to the 
complexity of its history. The cult of the One leads 
to totalitarianism, and thus to the disintegration and 
abolition of the cultural specificity of its followers.  
In this sense, the attempts to systematically 
eliminate certain elements of one’s cultural 
heritage show the radical bias of the vision that 
sustains it, the way in which the weakness of an 
ideology masks its true aims, which have nothing 
to do with a collective identity but strive instead to 
obtain political and economic power by oppressing 
the masses through sanction and terror. As an 
example, we can think of the many “cleansing” 
campaigns which have been carried out over the 
centuries in the name of a credo or an ideology, in 
different cultures and places around the world.   
And yet, we must distinguish between the 
past and current ways of attacking the cultural 
heritage of a given people. If various forms of 
fanaticism and millenarianism existed over the 
centuries, fundamentalism is of a recent date. 
Fundamentalism is inextricably linked to the 
history of the modern and industrial world, to the 
transformation of the class structure, to 
colonization, to the development of science and 
new technologies, as well as to the rise of, 
precisely, a new conception of the state inspired by 
the Rights of Man. The term itself is derived from 
The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Faith 
(1910-1915) of the American Baptist Church, 
which advocated a return to the dogmatic 
foundations of faith, contrary to both modernism 
and the Evangelical theological rationalism. In 
order to defend the Protestant faith against the 
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reformed tradition, Christian fundamentalism 
gained a foothold by attacking other forms of 
Protestantism, liberal theology, “Romanism” 
(Catholicism), socialism, modernism, atheism, 
evolutionism and so on and so forth. According to 
their nationalistic base, the values embodied by the 
conservatives in small American towns and 
villages expressed the “authenticity” of the nation, 
in contrast with the alleged depravity of urban 
modernism -- epitomized by woman, sexuality and 
alcohol.  
As an expression of change in modern 
society, fundamentalism must be distinguished 
from other forms of pre-modern fanaticism. Here, 
the fetishized, literalist and absolutist return to a 
supposedly “sacred” text -- seen as an expression 
of the divine word and a guarantor of a monolithic 
world vision -- takes on the form of a paranoiac 
convulsion as a reaction to the hostility or the 
transformation of local conditions. Such conditions 
are part of a social reality in which the foreign has 
already gained control. It is impossible to ignore 
the fact that the present-day manifestations of 
fundamentalism are also expressions of 
globalization, the development of human rights, the 
free movement of ideologies, the speed of 
information as well as the transformation of the 
neoliberal economy, which has developed thanks 
to factors such as the supranational powers of 
investment. 
As the vicissitudes of its name illustrate, 
ISIS deliberately makes a reference to the idea of 
the state. It has proclaimed a program of territorial 
conquest (following the slogan “Consolidation and 
expansion”) based on a totalitarian state as its 
preliminary condition. Its aim is to subjugate 
nations conquered by force, to “denationalize” 
them in order to align them with a law that is 
imposed through the systematic destruction of the 
specificities of the subjected groups, and of the 
cultural reference points underpinning their 
national images. Following the Wahhabi slogan 
revived by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (named 'Caliph' 
by ISIS in July 2014): "Those who would not 
conform to this view should be killed, their wives 
and daughters violated, and their possessions 
confiscated." 
Hannah Arendt observes that 
totalitarianism is an expression of the mass society 
and a form of power that differs from both 
despotism and tyranny: it implies a systematic 
destruction of the existing social, political and legal 
traditions, and imposes a regime of terror, which 
makes ideology into a principle of action. These 
applied ideologies, Arendt remarks, are “-isms” 
which to the satisfaction of their adherents can 
explain everything and every occurrence by 
deducing it from a single premise – a 
comprehensive explanation of reality, which can 
interpret any political act as a secret conspiracy and 
encourages both the acting out and the enjoyment 
associated to it. What is particular to the mass 
crimes such regimes perpetrate, is their attempt to 
strike at and abolish the symbolic universe of the 
victims; it is a will to deprive them of their cultural 
heritage and identity – as it was the case in the 
“final solution.” The cult of the One brings out the 
passion of hatred that aims at the other’s being, at 
the other’s uniqueness and history, and tries to 
abolish its symbolic environment – whether the 
target is the body, art, architecture, books or habits.  
In this context, it is no accident that 
fundamentalists of different cultures share one 
common target: women. According to Lacan, 
hatred as a passion is what comes the closest to the 
ex-sistence of the speaking being [parlêtre]. It is a 
response to the subjective division expressed 
through the act of speaking in the structural 
discordance between knowing and being; a 
division manifested on the side of speech closer to 
the subject’s eternal exile. It is a response elicited 
by the encounter of the limitations of the Symbolic 
in face of the Real. Which brings up the irreducible 
aspect of the encounter with difference and its 
traumatic quality. It is not by accident that Freud 
makes the refusal of femininity (Ablehnung der 
Weiblichkeit) a key factor in the subject’s 
resistance to his or her own truth, regardless of 
one’s sex.  The unrelenting fight against 
femininity, the desire to subjugate it, to reduce it to 
nothingness, shows the unbearable character of the 
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confrontation with a difference that is, in fact, an 
encounter with one’s own difference and division. 
The “love of the whole” -- the belief in a phallic, 
imaginary, turgescent completeness -- shows its 
fundamentalist tendencies, its terroristic 
implications, as a result of the denial of subjective 
ex-sistence.  
Related to the structural exile of being, 
hatred aims at the irreducibility of the One within 
difference. The Other cannot be added to the One; 
the two can never be complementary – quite the 
contrary, the Other differentiates itself from the 
One, emphasizing its intrinsic discordance and 
undermining the dream of an ideal and satisfying 
complementarity.  
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